Security Testing for UAE Manufacturers

In the UAE an industrial or critical-infrastructure operator is expected to test its environment against IEC 62443 for OT and ICS, the NESA CIIP guidance for critical information infrastructure, and the UAE IAS for the wider information-security baseline. We map findings to whichever of these applies to you rather than claiming certification against any of them.

IEC 62443

The reference for industrial automation and control systems. We scope zones and conduits, the IT/OT boundary and the controllers inside, and report findings mapped to the relevant parts rather than to a single score.

NESA CIIP guidance

Operators of critical information infrastructure are expected to test periodically and after significant change, with findings tracked to closure. The engagement produces the scope rationale, findings, owners and retest evidence an assessor reads.

UAE IAS

The national information assurance baseline covers the enterprise IT that surrounds the plant. We scope it alongside the OT so the boundary between the two is tested, not assumed.

An OT and ICS penetration test covers the IT/OT boundary, the industrial network and its segmentation, the engineering workstations and jump hosts that bridge both sides, and the PLCs, HMIs and SCADA servers that drive the process. In this region the serious findings sit at the boundary and in the paths between zones.

The most common high-severity finding we report in manufacturing is a route from enterprise IT into the control network that was assumed to be segmented but is not: a dual-homed workstation, a shared credential or a flat VLAN that lets an attacker reach a controller from the office network. It is tested by hand, zone by zone.

We scope the enterprise network, the boundary and the control network separately, because a control enforced at the firewall is not the same as one enforced at the device, and an attacker reaches the device.

Yes. OT testing is agreed in writing first, denial-of-service and intrusive techniques are excluded by default on live equipment, and the rules of engagement fix the testing window, the excluded techniques and a deconfliction contact before any work starts, so nothing arrives as a surprise.

Where a test case could affect a live production line or a safety system, it runs against a production-equivalent environment instead of the running plant. Where that environment differs materially from production, the report says so, because a test of a different configuration is a test of a different system.

A named contact on both sides handles the case where a tester finds an active compromise rather than a weakness. That path is settled before day one, not during the incident.

A UAE manufacturer should test anything internet-facing at least annually, test the IT/OT boundary after any change to segmentation or remote access, and test the control network before a new line, a new integration or a major controller change reaches production. Where a standard names an interval, treat it as a floor rather than a schedule.

A new MES integration, a new remote-access path for a vendor or a change to the firewall between IT and OT are the changes most likely to introduce the flaws that matter, and each is a reason to test the affected area rather than wait for the annual cycle.

We run the same phases on every engagement so two reports a year apart are comparable, and you can see what changed rather than reading two unrelated documents.

Yes. Every engagement produces the chain an assessor asks for: the scope and why it was drawn that way, the authorisation, the findings with severity and owners, the remediation order, and the retest report that turns a finding marked resolved into a finding with evidence behind it.

You also receive a signed attestation of testing for procurement and auditors. It states the scope, the dates, the standard applied and the outcome, which is what most assessors and tender teams actually require.

Findings are mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, including the ICS matrix, so your detection team can see which techniques were used and whether anything noticed.

Most manufacturers start with an infrastructure pentest of the enterprise IT and the IT/OT boundary, add an OT and ICS pentest across the control network, and test the operational web portals and MES APIs that cross between the two. An objective-based Red Team and a social engineering test follow once the basics are covered.

The right mix depends on what you are protecting and which standard has been asked of you. We scope it with you rather than selling a fixed bundle, and we say where something is not worth buying yet.

The operators are named and vetted against a published bar, not quietly subcontracted, so you know who is on the engagement before it starts. The work runs under a signed NDA and written rules of engagement that fix the scope, the window and what is off limits.

You get a direct line to the person who found each issue rather than a channel routed through an account manager. If a finding needs a walk-through, you talk to the tester who wrote it, and the retest after you fix is priced at scoping, not sold afterwards.

Evidence handling, including retention and destruction, is stated in writing, so you know what we hold and when it is gone.