You learn what your controls miss
Which step alerted, which was logged and never actioned, and which was invisible. That list is the deliverable, and no scan produces it.
Prove it. Do not assume it.
Red Team Security
Objective-based Red Team engagements run from Dubai. We go after a crown jewel you name, the way a real intruder would, then show you exactly what your detection and response did about it.
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Red Team engagements / year
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VAPT engagements / year
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CVE numbers assigned
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Responsible disclosures
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Company certifications
What is Red Teaming
Red Teaming is an objective-based security engagement in which a team of operators attempts to reach a specific, named asset inside your organisation using the same methods a real intruder would, while your defenders are not told it is happening. It measures whether an attack would be detected and stopped, rather than how many vulnerabilities exist.
It is rarely the right first purchase. Run against an estate with nothing watching, it produces an expensive report confirming what you already suspected, which is why we say so before quoting, not after.
The benefits of Red Teaming by RTS
What an engagement is actually for, stated as outcomes you can hold us to, not as features.
You get a path, not a list
An attack path graph showing how one ordinary foothold became access to the thing that matters. The order of the steps is the finding.
Your Blue Team keeps something
The purple debrief turns every step we took into detection content your own team writes and owns, in your own tooling.
Evidence a regulator accepts
Scope rationale, authorisation, findings with owners, remediation record and retest. That chain is what CBUAE, DESC, IAS and ADHICS examiners actually read.
A rehearsal before the real thing
Your incident process runs under conditions close to a genuine event, at a time when the consequences of it going badly are zero.
A number you can compare
Every technique mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, so this engagement is comparable with the last one and with the next provider's.
See an engagement in action
In, through, out. Scroll an engagement from the first foothold to the report, and watch what your side of it does about each step.
IN · Initial access
A foothold, and a channel nobody is looking at.
A pretext your staff would plausibly accept opens one workstation. The beacon then calls home through github.com, because outbound traffic to a service your developers use all day is the last thing a proxy log flags.
THROUGH · Blinding the endpoint
The agent is not bypassed. It is switched off.
Credentials carry us sideways, then a signed but vulnerable driver goes in. From kernel space the EDR and XDR callbacks are simply unhooked. Where a path runs out, the client stands up a leg up for us, an Azure VM or a file share, so the engagement keeps testing rather than stalling.
THROUGH · Tier-0
A certificate is a better key than a password.
A SYSTEM token lifted out of the EPROCESS list gets us local privilege. Then AD CS does the rest: a template missing its security extension, mis-issued and mapped to a Domain Admin. No password was ever cracked.
Detection · Your side of it
One alert, and not the one you would expect.
The SOC catches an anomalous certificate request on the CA. Not the driver, not the token theft, not four hosts of lateral movement. Which step alerted, which was only logged, and how long we sat there is the actual finding.
OUT · Exfiltration
Proof of access, never damage.
The evidence package leaves over the same covert channel it arrived on, which tests whether outbound movement is noticed at all. Nothing is encrypted, deleted or genuinely taken.
Reporting · What you keep
The engagement ends as detections, not a PDF.
The attack narrative, the path graph, and a detection gap analysis naming every step your controls did not see, turned into content your Blue Team owns at the purple debrief.
<in> pretext accepted, session opened
<in> c2 established over github.com
<through> credential reuse, host 2 of 4
<through> brs.sys loaded, edr callbacks unhooked
<through> failed to reach dc, leg up requested
<through> eprocess walk, system token stolen
<through> adcs esc9, certificate issued as da
<detect> soc alert on ca, containment begins
<objective> ebics server reached
- ADVERSARY
- PERIMETER
- WORKSTATIONFOOTHOLD
- WORKSTATIONEDR BYPASSED
- LEG UPLU1 AZURE VM
- FILE SERVER
- AD CSESC9 / ESC10
- DOMAIN CTRLDOMAIN ADMIN
- EBICS SERVER
- CARD DATA
Red Teaming vs Blue Teaming
Two halves of the same question: one goes looking for the way in, the other has to see it coming. Run them together and you get the third.
Offence
Red Teaming
Works against your estate the way a real intruder would, without warning anybody, to find out what actually happens rather than what is supposed to.
- AnswersWould somebody get in, and would you see it happen?
- Works byAttacking the live estate, unannounced
- MeasuresDetection and response under real conditions
- OutputThe route walked, and every step your controls missed
- Who runs itUs, from outside your organisation
Offence and defence, together
Purple Teaming
The same attack run with the room watching. Nothing is hidden, so a gap becomes a working detection on the day it is found rather than in the report six weeks later.
- AnswersWhat did we miss, and can we close it while we watch?
- Works byRed and blue on one timeline, tooling open
- MeasuresHow fast a missed technique becomes a detection
- OutputDetection content your own team wrote and owns
- Who runs itUs alongside your SOC, in the same room
Defence
Blue Teaming
Holds the estate every day: the detection content, the alerting and the response that has to work at three in the morning without anyone rehearsing it.
- AnswersCan we see it, and can we shut it down?
- Works byBuilding, tuning and operating detection
- MeasuresCoverage across the estate, day to day
- OutputDetection rules, runbooks and tuned alerting
- Who runs itYour own SOC and engineering teams
Red Teaming by RTS vs other providers
Three kinds of company sell this in the UAE and they are not interchangeable. This is where we actually sit, including where somebody else is the better answer.
| RTS | Regional VAPT firm | Global consultancy | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who runs your engagement | Named operators who cleared a published bar | Often unnamed, frequently subcontracted | Named partner, delivery by junior staff |
| Operator standard published | Yes, four conditions, in writing | Rarely | Rarely at operator level |
| Objective-based scoping | Always. A named crown jewel or we do not call it Red Teaming | Usually asset-list based | Yes, at a price |
| Detection and response measured | Primary deliverable | Rarely, Blue Team is usually told | Yes |
| Purple debrief included | Included in the engagement | Sold separately if at all | Sold separately |
| Retest | Priced at scoping | Sold after the report | Sold after the report |
| UAE regulator mapping | CBUAE, DESC, IAS, ADHICS, all four | Usually one, named in passing | Generic, mapped to global frameworks |
| Evidence handling published | Yes, retention and destruction stated | Rarely | Contractual, not public |
| Time zone and travel | Dubai based, on site when useful | Regional | Often flown in, billed accordingly |
| Better choice than us when | Not applicable | You need high-volume routine scanning at low cost | You need a global multi-region programme with one contract |
The last row is deliberate. If you need cheap recurring scanning across two hundred assets, or a single contract covering eleven countries, we are not the right supplier and we would rather say so at this stage than at the third meeting.
Supported Red Teaming frameworks
Two supervisory programmes and one taxonomy. Knowing which is which is the fastest way to check a proposal.
- TIBER-EUThreat-intelligence-based ethical Red Teaming, run by European central banks. Our engagements follow its sequence. It is not a vendor certification.
- ARTAdvanced Red Teaming, used for critical financial infrastructure in the Netherlands. Same reasoning, own governance. We are informed by it, not accredited under it.
- MITRE ATT&CKThe technique taxonomy every finding is written in, which is what makes one engagement comparable with the next.
ISO 27001
Information security management, certified at the company level.
ISO 9001
Quality management, which is what keeps engagement delivery repeatable.
Written for both audiences
You get an attack narrative in plain language, an attack path graph, a detection gap analysis that names which step your controls missed, and technical findings with remediation your team can act on directly.
Every technique is mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, so the report lines up with the framework your risk function already reports against. A retest is available once fixes land.
Four UAE regulators expect this
Most engagements here start because something external asked for one. Each of these is explained in full, with what it requires and how often.
Headquartered in Dubai
RedTeam Security is operated by WebSec FZCO from IFZA Business Park in Dubai Silicon Oasis. That is where the company is registered and where the team sits. It is not the edge of where the work goes. Engagements run remotely or on site across the UAE and the wider GCC, into Europe, and into the United States, on the working week your organisation actually keeps.
Being based here is an advantage rather than a limit. The regulators, the sectors and the supplier ecosystems that shape an attack path in this region are not the ones a foreign provider will model by default. Where an engagement sits in Europe or North America, the same team and the same methodology travel to it.
The four things everyone asks first
How long does it take?
Six to ten weeks end to end, covering scoping and rules of engagement, threat intelligence, the active phase, reporting and the debrief. Assumed breach is shorter because it skips initial access.
Will our team know?
No. That is what makes the result meaningful. A small white team on your side holds the authorization letter and a deconfliction channel, so a real incident can be told apart from us within minutes.
What does it cost?
Quoted per engagement, because scope, objective and estate size drive the effort. Tell us the crown jewel and roughly how large the estate around it is and we can put a number against it.
What if something breaks?
Nothing is encrypted, deleted or exfiltrated for real, and production changes are agreed in advance or not made. Every artefact we leave is listed for removal at clean closure.
Let's talk about your security
Tell us the objective you want tested. We reply with a scope, a timeline and a quote.
- IFZA Business Park, Building A2
Nadd Hessa, Dubai Silicon Oasis
Dubai, United Arab Emirates - [email protected]
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IFZA Business Park, Building A2
Nadd Hessa, Dubai Silicon Oasis
Dubai, United Arab Emirates